confident, a largely unnecessary chronological history. Inevitably though, the past frames the present but I shall try to draw on it only as necessary. With that in mind, let us turn firstly to Commonwealth spending.
The Commonwealth's Spending Power after the Tax Bonus Case
The Tax Bonus Case concerned a challenge by Bryan Pape to the Tax Bonus for
Working Australians Act (No 2) 2009 (Cth). The Act provided that the Taxation
Commissioner was required to issue "tax bonus" payments of one of three fixed amounts to all Australian residents with a taxable income of or under $100,000 and an adjusted tax liability of more than nil in the 2007-08 income year. The purpose of these payments was to "provide immediate economic stimulus" so as to guard against the effects of the "Global Financial Crisis". Section 3 of the Act enabled the bonuses to be drawn against a standing appropriation from Consolidated Revenue.
The Tax Bonus Case undoubtedly throws up several major questions, some of them fairly worrying, but it does at least manage to conclusively answer one that had hitherto eluded clear determination by the Court. The notion that s 81 of the Commonwealth Constitution provided a source of power for the federal executive to spend money it appropriated from Consolidated Revenue attracted a fair level of implicit support in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case of 1945 and the AAP case thirty years later, despite division as to whether this power was at large or was limited by the qualification that an appropriation be "for the purposes of the Commonwealth".
The meaning of that phrase takes on far less significance in light of the unanimous view of the Court in the Tax Bonus Case that neither s 81 nor the further requirement in s 83 that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury "except under appropriation made by law" confers a substantive power upon the Commonwealth to enact legislation authorising the expenditure of money so appropriated. 2 As the Chief Justice said, the provisions in question:
"are better seen as parliamentary controls of the exercise of executive power to expend public moneys than as a substantive source of such power. It follows that the "purposes of the Commonwealth", for which appropriation may be authorised, are to be found in the provisions of the Constitution and statutes made under it which, subject to appropriation, confer substantive power to expend public moneys." the Commonwealth did also seek to sustain the Act using the powers to make laws with respect to taxation, trade and commerce and external affairs. However, the majority judges were relieved of the need to discuss these possible sources of support by their accepting that the stimulus spending was a valid exercise of the executive power in s 61 of the Constitution, with the law enacted in exercise of the incidental power in s 51(xxxix). It was on the scope of the executive power that consensus amongst the Court came to an end resulting in a 4:3 split.
In ruling the payment of the tax bonuses within the executive power, the Chief Ibid. Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ, directly citing the CJ"s Tampa reasons, expressed the view that "the executive power of the Commonwealth enables the undertaking of action appropriate to the position of the Commonwealth as a polity created by the Constitution and having regard to the spheres of responsibility vested in it", which they certainly saw as including "the protection of the body politic or nation of Australia": 83. to concede to this aspect of the executive power a wide operation effecting a radical transformation in what has hitherto been thought to be the Commonwealth"s area of responsibility under the Constitution".
9
In rejecting the stimulus spending as a valid exercise of executive power, the dissenting opinions in the Tax Bonus Case forcefully invoked these words.
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The importance attributed to the federal structure by the two majority judgments was, however, more telling. As several commentators have pointed out, the joint judgment of Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ was notably less concerned about setting boundaries on the potential scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth than that of the Chief Justice. Perhaps the most surprising feature of the former was the broad analogising of the power contained in s 61, so far as the raising and expenditure of public moneys, with that of "the executive in the United Kingdom at the time of the inauguration of the Commonwealth". 11 Their Honours found that a feature of the latter which had been carried over to the federal polity in Australia today was the capability to "respond to a crisis be it war, natural disaster or a financial crisis on the scale here". 12 There was no real attempt made to justify this claim of similarity between such challenges, yet it is far from clear that they each give rise to a corresponding requirement for action which, on Mason J"s formulation,
is "peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the benefit of the nation". While the minority judges disputed that this was satisfied, 13 the joint judgment merely asserted that the "point is that only the Commonwealth has the resources to meet the emergency which is presented to it as a nation state".
14 Although he provided the crucial fourth vote to uphold the Act, French CJ was far more circumspect on the underlying principles in play and his reasons have been widely identified as pivotal to an appreciation of the case. His Honour would not go any further than to say that the executive power "extends to the short term fiscal measures in question" while insisting this did not amount to a "general power to manage the national economy". 15 Furthermore, and in contrast to the joint judgment, the Chief Justice was hesitant about "identification of a class of events or circumstances which might, under some general rubric such as "national concern" or "national emergency" enliven the executive power". 16 In a further distinction, he showed no interest in equating the power in s 61 with that of the UK government, nor did he echo the suggestions in the joint judgment that the spending capacity took its measure from the breadth of the power to tax.
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Having repeated Mason J"s qualification to his remarks in the AAP Case, the Chief Justice was express that the significance of the federal distribution of powers, as well as the separation of powers across the national government, could not be displaced by an invocation of the exigencies of "national government". 18 The limiting effect of these constitutional principles was to be determined on a case by case basis. suggested that it was, so far as it supports Commonwealth spending, as unbounded as some earlier judges had found s 81 to be. While the joint majority judgment easily went the furthest in suggesting a broad spending capacity, even those judges expressly confined their reasons as not "going beyond the notions of national emergency". 23 As worryingly "protean and imprecise" as that concept is, 24 it nevertheless suggests some kind of boundary -one which offers little resistance, it might be thought, to challenges to spending such as Kerr"s hypothetical and also Mr
Pape"s more recent bête noire, the Commonwealth funding of local councils to construct bicycle pathways. In any case, it is wisest to understand the import of the Commonwealth grants to local councils resulting from the decision as strengthening the case for the looming constitutional referendum on local government to address funding. 25 That certainly has implications for Australia"s divided system of government, but ones presently best left merely as noted.
More directly on point, the use made by Guy and Hocking of the question mark provided by the Tax Bonus Case was to append it to the notion of a "revival of cooperative federalism". 26 They said:
…the case highlights a resurgence in cooperative federalism since what it means, in effect, is that the Commonwealth will be unable to use the executive and spending powers to unilaterally intervene in the dominant realm of the states to implement (for example) social welfare programmes or economic policies initiatives that cannot be directly linked to a constitutional head of power.
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They went so far as to conclude that this "will no doubt facilitate a revival of the political primacy of the states in the federal constitutional balance of power".
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Kerr, by contrast, warns that such predictions are "premature". With the knowing voice of government experience, he says:
The Commonwealth is unlikely to radically revise the financial mechanisms it has evolved to extend its policy agenda into areas beyond its legislative competence unless faced with the necessity of doing so. [The Tax Bonus Case] does not supply that necessity. To that end, in usefully suggesting to the Commonwealth that its fiscal powers are not at large, perhaps the greatest importance of the Tax Bonus Case is simply in underscoring the mutual gains to be made through intergovernmental co-operation.
Grants through the prism of the 2008 IGA
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Ibid.
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Ibid. Given this history, it is difficult to foresee how reform of vertical fiscal imbalance might occur. In not addressing either VFI, or for that matter, horizontal fiscal equalisation, the 2008 IGA has been accused of being "predicated on the assumption that the federal financial system is structurally sound". 40 That probably is exactly how the Commonwealth does see the lie of the land. The recently announced review into the means of distributing GST to the States shows that, at least in the unusual times of a minority government, the Commonwealth is willing to entertain a rejigging of how revenue is apportioned across the federation, but it seems safe to say that it continues to be highly satisfied with the size of its tax base relative to the States. In light of the persistence of these underlying fiscal settings, the IGA has been criticised as little more than a further instance of the Commonwealth"s continuing usurpation of the functions of State governments through exercise of its entrenched financial dominance. 41 Bryan Pape has complained that "co-operative federalism has given way to collaborative federalism and now to executive federalism". 42 The tension between these degrees of intergovernmental engagement was well recognised by Martin Painter in his important research into Australian federalism over the 1990s. Undeniably, the growth of COAG over the last two decades has further concentrated the dominance of executive government and poses distinct challenges for parliamentary oversight. 43 This demands continued attention and possibly even deeper structural reform.
But Pape"s lament is more specific than this. He focuses particularly on the use of a standing appropriation from Consolidated Revenue to the COAG Reform Fund from which the Commonwealth executive may determine to make grants of financial assistance to the States and Territories on the terms and conditions set out in written agreements between them. 44 The use of a standing appropriation is not itself, as the Pape"s concern over executive empowerment in this regard is appreciable but it is hard to doubt the constitutionality of these arrangements is secure. I would further submit that I find no great attraction in the alternative, so far as the conduct of federal relations is concerned. Even if the involvement of the Commonwealth in many of these areas was to cease, it seems fair to assume it would not relinquish its commanding financial position. State action in important areas would, we might presume be both underfunded and unco-ordinated.
Ultimately, I would submit that the IGA on Federal Financial Relations is to be assessed not against an idealised system of co-ordinate federalism, of the kind we have not seen since before the First World War, but instead against an appreciation of just how bankrupt the federal system might conceivably be given certain features 45 Ibid, 14-15. Consequently, the Commonwealth"s coercive capacity is a spectre that inevitably hangs over intergovernmental relations in our federal system.
Despite these elements, we remain a very long way from the bleak picture that
Latham CJ in the First Uniform Tax Case painted for the States as a vision of their future the Court would be powerless to prevent. As his Honour recognised, the operation of financial powers upon the state of the federation was a matter for the "political arena", not the Courts. 48 That being so, and notwithstanding the need to closely monitor its operation and specific concerns as to its fragility, I share 
